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Viviana Zelizer’s recent book, The Purchase of Intimacy (2005),
presents an innovative theory of how social and legal actors negotiate rights and
obligations when money changes hands in intimate relationships—a perspective
that could change how we understand many things, from valuations of homemaking labor to the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. This essay describes
Zelizer’s critique of the reductionist “Hostile Worlds” and “Nothing But”
approaches to economic exchange in intimate relationships and then explains
her more three-dimensional approach, “Connected Lives.” While Zelizer
focuses on family law, the essay goes beyond that context, extending Zelizer’s
approach to transfers of genetic material and concluding that her approach
could point toward a more equitable resolution of disputes in and about these
markets.
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TRANSCENDING BOTH PRICE AND PRICELESSNESS
The best academic projects make readers think in new ways, leaving
them shaking their heads, wondering how they could ever have thought the
old way. Economic sociologist Viviana Zelizer’s work achieves this feat. Her
recent book, The Purchase of Intimacy (2005), presents an innovative theory
of how social and legal actors negotiate rights and obligations when money
changes hands in intimate relationships—a perspective that could change
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how we understand many things, from valuations of homemaking labor to the
9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. Her integrated “Connected Lives” should
appeal to law and society scholars because it transcends the common tendency to treat market and nonmarket spheres simplistically, as if they were
either “Hostile Worlds” (à la Michael Walzer) or “Nothing But,” another
monolithic system (à la Chicago-school legal economics) (1). Zelizer’s recognition of economic elements in intimacy may explain why Richard Epstein
(2005), reviewing The Purchase of Intimacy in the New York Times Book
Review, described her “straightforward but powerful point [that the] sharp
division scholars want to draw between money and intimacy does not capture
the multiple relationships of ordinary people” (23). Nevertheless, he would
shoo her away from law and back toward sociology, wishing she had addressed
empirical questions, such as “Which couples choose to adopt prenuptial
agreements, and why? Which couples keep separate property after marriage,
and which do not? Does the movement of women into high-level positions in
the work force alter family planning?” (23).
Many law and society scholars find Zelizer’s theoretical insights about
law helpful, particularly her 1994 book The Social Meaning of Money, which
came on the scene just as legal economics approached ascendancy in the legal
academy.1 In response to commentators like Epstein, on the one hand, and
Margaret Jane Radin (1987, 1996)—who protested that legal economics
reduced human experience to one dimension—on the other, Zelizer has
staked out a middle ground. Her work has appealed to scholars who see
both the merits of market mechanisms and the dangers of universal
commodification in doctrines governing domestic relations (Silbaugh 1997;
Dolgin 1997; Hasday 2005; Sanger 2007), poverty (Coven 2002), intellectual
property (Rao 2000), insurance (Baker 1996, 2001; Stone 1999), tax (Staudt
1996), and property (Rose 1994), as well as commodification theory
(Williams 2000; G. Cohen 2003; Case 2005). This crossover popularity is possible because of the extraordinary breadth of Zelizer’s expertise, encompassing
such diverse topics as life insurance, adoption, and adult intimate relationships (Zelizer 1979, 1985, 1994). I have used her analyses in my own work to
argue that marketization can help alleviate power disparities both within
families and among different types of families (Ertman 1998, 2003, 2007).
Zelizer’s (2005) Connected Lives approach captures how people carefully define social roles, rights, and responsibilities when intimacy and
monetary transactions coincide (20–22). Her argument rests on an impressive
accretion of legal and social evidence showing how people and institutions
negotiate economic aspects of intimacy and intimate aspects of economic
life. While she relies heavily on case law—such as cohabitants’ disputes
1. The Social Meaning of Money won the American Sociological Association’s (ASA)
Culture Section Book Award in 1996. A further measure of Zelizer’s stature is that in 2003 the
ASA’s Economic Sociology section named its annual book prize after her.
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post-breakup, engagement ring cases, and the 9/11 Victim Compensation
Fund determinations regarding recovery by surviving same-sex partners—she
also marshals a wide variety of other quasi-legal and nonlegal sources, from
the American Psychological Association’s Code of Conduct defining impermissible intimacies to Emily Post’s Etiquette advice on returning engagement
rings. Of particular interest to legal scholars are her explanations of how
courts fall into logical errors by engaging in Hostile Worlds or Nothing But
thinking.
Perhaps because she is a sociologist rather than a law professor, Zelizer
does not venture an opinion as to whether the cases she considers were rightly
decided. She says from the outset that her agenda is descriptive, not normative (5, 42). She maps in great detail how and why people worry about
intersections between intimate and monetary spheres and how law navigates
these disputes. But she does not suggest policy changes, except to urge us to
abandon absolute, reductionist approaches, presumably so that we might
come to new and better insights. For law, this change would at a minimum
facilitate a legal discourse that candidly admits overlaps between finances and
intimacy. On coherence grounds alone, this shift in thinking would improve
existing discussions in scholarship, as well as among lawyers, clients, and
judges.
This essay proceeds in two parts. First, it details Zelizer’s critique of the
reductionist Hostile Worlds and Nothing But approaches. It then explains
her more three-dimensional approach, Connected Lives. Her main focus is on
family law, which explains why much of her crossover appeal has been in
domestic relations scholarship, but her analysis could apply equally well in
other contexts. Accordingly, I conclude by testing the generalizability of
Zelizer’s approach beyond her analysis of family relations, applying it to
transfers of genetic material, a markedly more impersonal instance of contested commodification. Analytically, my extension extends Zelizer’s descriptive account to a normative level. Her framework, I contend, can be applied
outside family law to reinterpret the leading case on markets in genetic
materials to reveal dangerous distributive consequences of the decision. It
may similarly point toward a more equitable resolution of disputes in other
instances of contested marketization.

ZELIZER’S APPROACH: CRITIQUING THE DUALISM OF
PRICE AND PRICELESSNESS
Zelizer’s main point—that money and intimacy overlap in complex
ways—hardly requires a whole book. You can get it by watching a thirtysecond “priceless” MasterCard ad. One of the ads shows successive images of
a father playing ball with the same child as a toddler, a young boy, and a
teenager, intoning as the items and prices appear on the screen: “rubber ball:
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$6; softball: $5; football: $35. Being ready for whatever parenthood throws at
you: priceless. There are some things that money can’t buy. For everything
else there’s . . . MasterCard” (MasterCard n.d.).
The ad works because it taps into a paradox. It begins by treating markets
and intimacy as interdependent, enumerating a few material components of
parenthood to demonstrate the importance of materially providing for children. Then it veers in the opposite direction, treating market and emotional
concerns as diametrically opposed by invoking the sentimentalist truism that
money cannot buy love. In short, it depicts parenthood (and family generally)
as simultaneously inside and outside of markets, while at the same time
proclaiming an impermeable boundary between the two realms.
Zelizer’s contribution is to make sense of this paradox by showing how
it arises repeatedly in legal disputes, and to reframe it to help us better
understand situations where money seems out of place, yet it keeps showing
up nonetheless. Her critique of the dueling approaches to contested commodification addresses each half of this paradox in turn, looking first at
pricelessness, then at price. Ultimately, she aims to resolve it by embracing
both.
For all the straightforwardness of its core message, the book is also
complex. Zelizer makes her main point in concrete language, emphasizing it
so strongly that she repeats herself perhaps more than is necessary. But close
examination shows more going on. Consistent with her determination to
reveal plural meanings of monetary exchanges, the very title of The Purchase
of Intimacy carries multiple meanings. Zelizer (2005) means to address both
“purchase” in the obvious sense of paying with money and in the more subtle
sense of “purchase” as grasp, “how the powerful grip of intimacy affects the
ways we organize economic life” (2). The book achieves these goals, offering
us new ways to understand both how money affects intimacy and how intimacy affects economic life.

Pricelessness: Hostile Worlds
First, pricelessness. Zelizer’s term for the “pricelessness” approach,
Hostile Worlds, vividly evokes resistance, even aversion, in contrast to the
neutrality of “separate spheres” (20). Having set the tone, she systematically
reveals Hostile Worlds’ two-dimensionality. Hostile Worlds views, which
sometimes take the guise of communitarianism, maintain sharp, impermeable
boundaries between money and contested commodities like love, babies, and
body parts. A Hostile Worlds lens zooms in on one sentence of the MasterCard ad: “There are some things money can’t buy.” In In re Baby M (1988),
arguably the most widely discussed case of contested commodification, the
New Jersey Supreme Court used almost the exact phrasing in refusing to
enforce a surrogacy contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William
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Stern: “There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy”
(1249).
Hostile Worlds positions often rely on similar assertions, like Michael
Walzer’s claim that “blocked exchanges,” such as money for sex, reflect our
“shared morality and sensibility” (quoting Walzer in Zelizer 2005, 22). Talcott
Parsons, Zelizer notes, also “sharply differentiated between the market and
the family” (Zelizer 2005, 43). Zelizer systematically debunks Hostile Worlds
assumptions by listing a wide range of intimate sexual relationships, each
involving different rules regarding economic exchange within the relationship, only some of which are socially or legally sanctioned (56). Dating often
involves one person picking up the tab, as opposed to “hooking up,” in which
intimates each pay their own way (114–15). Prostitution involves paying for
sex (124–29), while engagement involves the exchange of a valuable ring for
the promise to marry, leading to a wedding and, often enough, an expensive
party thrown by the bride’s family (108–14).2 Marriage, meanwhile, generally
involves property and income sharing.3 Zelizer builds on this factual foundation by enumerating legal doctrines that distinguish among these various
intimate relationships, recognizing that matching a particular relationship to
a doctrine can result in—or preclude—financial recovery. For example, she
explains, the law of consortium generally entitles a spouse, and only a spouse,
to recover money for the loss of companionship, affection, and sexual relations. Palimony, in contrast, entitles nonmarital couples to enforce contractual promises, unless the agreement was meretricious or mainly related to sex.
As Zelizer sees it, the rule barring enforcement of meretricious cohabitation
agreements is “a Hostile Worlds concept par excellence” (59):
Lawyers working in the American legal system spend a great deal of time
avoiding any arrangement that can be construed as legally binding
compensation for sexual services. They therefore make distinctions that
separate direct reward for sexual services from legitimate contracts. . . .
Most famously, the controversial 1976 Marvin v. Marvin decision stated
that “express agreements will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful
meretricious consideration.” (59)
According to Zelizer, courts follow predictable analytical steps to resolve cases
like Michelle Marvin’s claim against actor Lee Marvin to enforce his promises
to support her.

2. Zelizer notes a recent study documenting a $9 billion industry in engagement rings and
wedding bands (108). Surprisingly, and apropos of Zelizer’s main point, this report claimed that
Americans spend about as much for rings as for sexual services (119, citing Conde Nast Bridal
Infobank American Wedding Study 2002).
3. Zelizer lists heterosexual intimate relationships, differentiated in part by different
economic exchanges (56–61).
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First, courts consult a list of what Zelizer dubs “recognized relations”
(60), such as spouses, cohabitants, or master and servant. Next, they consult
precedent and analogy, sometimes making new law by extending precedent to
new contexts or claiming precedents contradict each other. Finally, they bind
the relationship as categorized with the precedent as interpreted to justify a
distributive outcome (60–61). She explains that this process often produces
a Hostile Worlds justification. For example, the California Supreme
Court allowed Michelle Marvin to assert contract claims against Lee Marvin
because their agreement was emotionally and socially intimate rather than
primarily sexual. In Hostile Worlds terms, enforcing that cohabitation contract would not cause sexual intimacy and monetary transaction to corrupt
one another. Most illuminating, the doctrine reveals the internal inconsistency of Hostile Worlds reasoning. Under the holding of Marvin v. Marvin
(1976), courts can only enforce monetary promises in intimate relations if the
intimate and financial worlds remain separate. Yet by awarding damages to
compensate for failure to keep an intimate promise, the recovery itself
breaches the boundary between the purportedly separate spheres.
Zelizer is hardly the first to recognize the limits of Hostile Worlds
reasoning. A wide range of scholars, from feminist sociologist Kathleen
Barry (1995) to Chicago School economist Gary Becker (1991), have
argued for radical commensurability by showing that pricelessness—radical
incommensurability—collapses under its own weight.4

Price: Nothing But Approaches
Returning to the phrasing of the MasterCard ad, we next address complete commensurability, which can be described as a price-based view of the
world. The other side of the Hostile Worlds coin, Nothing But appears less
frequently than the purported pricelessness of Hostile Worlds. Nevertheless,
it holds sway, especially in academic circles. Nothing But views take advantage of Hostile Worlds’ failure to account for the obvious overlap of intimacy
and money in parenthood as well as in the legal doctrines Zelizer discusses.
Where Hostile Worlds reasoning presupposes a two-dimensional world—
market on one side and family on the other—Nothing But views reduce social
and legal life to one dimension. Nothing But approaches, according to Zelizer
(2005), contend that a “simpler principle . . . actually explains what is going
on” (29). She catalogs these advocates into three camps: Nothing But
economic rationality, Nothing But culture, and Nothing But politics. Legal
academics will readily recognize the first group as Chicago school legal economists, contending along with Gary Becker (1991) and Richard Posner (1992)
4. A postmodern focus on power as an organizing principle similarly would reject Hostile
Worlds approaches to issues like prostitution. See Foucault (1978).
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that parenthood, marriage, friendship, sex, and other transactions that most
people think of as outside the market can nonetheless be viewed as Nothing
But rational economic transactions.5 This type of Nothing But scholarship,
for example, justifies postdivorce income sharing on the ground that marriage
is a type of long-term contract in which homemaking spouses expect a return
on “relationship-specific investments” (Zelizer 2005, 30).6
Cultural reductionists, in contrast, see human relations as Nothing But
“beliefs or ideological scripts” (29), while political reductionists such as
Kathleen Barry (1995) view prostitution as Nothing But coercion (78). In
describing the Nothing But category, Zelizer groups together views that
seldom meet, let alone marry. Placing Gary Becker’s fundamental premise of
universal markets alongside Kathleen Barry’s work positing universal coercion in sex work provides a novel intellectual organization. Moreover, and
more importantly, the grouping reveals the limits of both frameworks. Taking
prostitution as an example, Nothing But markets would justify legalizing
prostitution contacts, while Nothing But coercion would prohibit such
arrangements. If legal theory purports to both explain and predict outcomes,
Nothing But fails because it could justify opposite outcomes, depending on
one’s ideological and disciplinary commitments.
Zelizer illustrates Nothing But approaches by exploring social and legal
aspects of household governance. Defining “household” as “two or more
people who share living quarters and daily subsistence over substantial
periods of time” (Zelizer 2005, 213), she shows overlap of intimacy and
monetary transfers because households, so defined, include paid caregivers,
foster children, lovers, relatives, and family businesses in which household
members work. Household members, she explains, consequently develop
rights and obligations involving the intersection of intimacy and economic
activity. A Hostile Worlds formulation of legal doctrine regarding postdivorce
income sharing could deny recovery based on homemaking service on the
grounds that paying for work done for those we love corrupts that love. The
leading alternative, a Nothing But framework, might see this household as
Nothing But a firm like any other, or as a power structure. Viewing it as a firm
would justify compensation. Viewing it as a power structure could yield the
same result, though perhaps for tort-based restitution rather than contractual
exchange-based entitlements.
Zelizer only briefly considers a third major strand of commodification
discourse: moral arguments. Having made that choice, it makes sense that she
does not mention Michael Sandel, the leading moral philosopher contesting
5. The description is itself reductionist. For example, Richard Posner’s (1992) muchdiscussed book Sex and Reason combines economic analysis of sexuality with sociobiological
claims about genes’ utility maximization.
6. Zelizer (2005) notes David Friedman’s contention that spouses make “relationshipspecific investments,” resulting in a “bilateral monopoly with associated bargaining costs”
(quoting Friedman, 172, 30–31). See also L. Cohen (1987).
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universal marketization. If she had, she might have categorized his view as
Hostile Worlds extraordinaire, since he forcefully argues against markets in
contested commodities like kidneys and genetic improvements on the
grounds of both coercion and corruption (Sandel 1998, 2007).7 Zelizer does,
however, address some of Sandel’s concerns, contending that moral objections fail to account for the vast complexity where market and intimate
realms meet.
Although participants, observers, and third parties commonly mark such
distinctions with moral discourse and moral practice, rarely are the
defining interactions on one side of a boundary or the other universally
acceptable or unacceptable in themselves; they depend on context.
Sexual intercourse, for example, becomes an enforceable obligation for
spouses, an option for lovers, and a forbidden transgression for lawyerclient pairs. Similarly, expensive gifts become obligations in some
relations, options in others, and forbidden transgressions in still others.
The matching of relation, transaction, and medium matters crucially.
(Zelizer 2005, 99)
In short, moral reasoning, like Hostile Worlds analyses, simply lacks the
capacity to measure the many complex things that people carefully, and
continuously, negotiate on the boundaries of intimacy and markets.
Similarly, the reductionism of Nothing But approaches fails to reflect the
extraordinary complexity of how we live our financial and intimate relationships. We fold a $10 bill into a stork to transform plain currency into a gift,
and hand our dinner hosts a bottle of wine at the door rather than a $20 bill.
Even Landes and Posner (1978), arguing for a market in babies, stopped short
of advocating markets in older children and specific performance in baby
markets. Along the same lines, Nothing But coercion approaches use analytically problematic tools like false consciousness to explain the claims like
those by some erotic dancers that sex work is akin to other types of work, and
sex workers should be able to enjoy rights and protections of other workers
(Query, Montoya, and Funari 2000).

Zelizer’s Alternative: Connected Lives Approaches
This ubiquitous complexity suggests that Zelizer could well have called
her approach “Complex Lives.” Indeed, she dubbed it “Differentiated Ties” in

7. Sandel (1998, 2007) takes a moral stance to critique these transactions either as
coerced (no one would agree to sell a kidney unless forced by economic circumstances) or as
corrupt (as when genetic engineering corrupts the giftedness of human life).
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earlier iterations (Zelizer 2000; Williams and Zelizer 2005). Ultimately, she
chose to call it Connected Lives. Zelizer (2005) observes that
in everyday life, people invest intense effort and constant worry in
finding the right match between economic relations and intimate ties:
shared responsibility for housework, spending of household income, care
for children and old people, gifts that send the right message, provision
of adequate housing for loved ones, and much more. (3)
As conditions change, people renegotiate those ties (and their markers).
Cases she marshals to prove her point are wide-ranging factually and doctrinally, encompassing the Louisiana supermarket entrepreneur John Schwegman’s refusal to share his business holdings with his long-term cohabitant
Mary Ann Blackledge (47–48); Wichita attorney Jerry Berg’s sexual behavior
with his divorce clients (94–95); the contested will of Johnson & Johnson
heir J. Seward Johnson, who bequeathed his $2.4 billion fortune to his much
younger housekeeper after marrying her (158); and Hildegard Borelli’s unsuccessful attempt to enforce a contract to a share of her husband’s property in
exchange for caring for him in his final illness (287–88).
Borelli v. Brusseau (1993), familiar to many family law and contracts
teachers, nicely illustrates the limited facility of both Hostile Worlds and
Nothing But approaches. The California appellate court refused to enforce
Mr. Borelli’s promise to share his property with his wife in exchange for her
personally caring for him during his final illness, reasoning that as his wife she
was obliged to provide that care, conveniently ignoring that Mr. Borelli used
a premarital contract to avoid his companion duty to provide for her. According to Zelizer, Borelli illustrates deficiencies in Hostile Worlds and Nothing
But approaches:
Both sides of the Borelli v. Brusseau court decision impale themselves on
the horns of Hostile Worlds/Nothing-But reasoning. One horn declares
that marriage must remain sacred, insulated from commercial transactions; the other horn announces that marriage is a commercial transaction. Both sides thus fail to recognize one of this book’s most important
revelations: that every relationship of coupling, caring, and household
membership repeatedly mingles economic transactions and intimacy,
usually without contamination, yet relations of coupling, caring, and
household membership operate differently from other relationships.
(Zelizer 2005, 288)
The question Zelizer would have us ask, rather than whether intimates should
engage in economic exchanges (a pointless question since they do it all the
time), is “what sorts of economic transactions match which intimate
relations” (288).
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By recognizing fuzzy boundaries between intimate and commercial
realms, Zelizer reveals the false dichotomies that underlie both communitarian and legal economic discourse.8 In other words, labeling a contest as a
competition between freedom of contract, on one side, and dignity, equality,
and solidarity, on the other, underappreciates the complex ways that finances
and intimacy intersect. She is in good company here, and acknowledges as
much by applauding the work of legal scholars such as Carol Rose (1992,
1994), Reva Siegel (1994), Margaret Jane Radin (1996), Cass Sunstein
(1997), Linda Hirschman and Jane Larson (1998), Martha Nussbaum (1998),
and Joan Williams (2000), who also tread waters between the extremes of
commensurability and incommensurability (78–92).
Zelizer defends the Connected Lives approach by showing that even
when we claim to rope off an aspect of social life, or a particular thing as
beyond the market’s crass calculations, we still tolerate and even encourage
overlap between the two supposedly separate spheres (Zelizer 2000). She
argues for a more muted response to these overlaps, coupled with a wider
recognition of how frequently they occur. Money, in this view, is only one
element of intimate relationships, and its presence or absence should not
determine legal support or punishment for particular relations. Like a map of
the world that depicts North America as properly proportioned in relation to
other continents—unlike common maps produced in the United States that
exaggerate our own country’s prominence—Zelizer’s work invites us to redraw
the boundaries between the market and the family, and, in doing so, related
boundaries between secular and sacred, instrumental and altruistic, and
public and private.
Zelizer’s Connected Lives matrix documents the complex relationship
between monetary exchanges and intimate relationships by enumerating four
steps in the analysis of relational work by courts. Using her model, the
remainder of this essay summarizes Zelizer’s argument that courts engage in four
stages of “relational work” (Zelizer 2005, 37) when regulating overlaps between
intimacy and monetary exchange: (1) relations—naming a relationship, erecting a boundary by naming it, and marking it with distinctive practices; (2)
transactions—examining a particular transaction; (3) media—evaluating the
media of exchange, such as with an accounting system or other tokens; and (4)
boundaries—establishing or affirming boundaries around distinctive combinations of relations, transactions, and media. This fourth step holds particular
relevance for legal purposes. If discourse produces approval for the economic
transaction within the boundary that has been created, courts may grant
recovery; if not, parties seeking relief may well be out of luck.

8. For a discussion of the false dichotomies common in commodification discussions that
diametrically oppose markets with altruism, resulting in two lines of discourse that travel along
fixed rails with no hope of genuinely engaging one another, see Ertman and Williams (2005,
1–5).
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There is a poststructuralist cast to Zelizer’s approach. For poststructuralist feminists, sex is a discursive construct rather than a biological fact. In
this view, sex becomes an effect of discourse, not a cause of it. This perspective fatally undermines policies based on contentions that men and women
are essentially different (see Fuss 1989; Butler 1990). Zelizer’s Connected
Lives approach resembles this position by rejecting essentialist notions of
money and intimacy (Ertman 2003), and revealing that Hostile Worlds is not
a truth that causes outcomes in cases. Instead, Hostile Worlds is an effect of
the larger process of creating and maintaining a complex interaction between
economic and purportedly noneconomic relationships. In Zelizer’s (2005)
words, “Hostile Worlds ideas and practices emerge from the effort to mark and
defend boundaries between categories of relations that contain some common
elements, could be confused, and would threaten existing relations of trust if
confused” (36).
Anthropologists have long recognized the tendency of items and relationships to evade essentialist categorization by slipping in and out of the
market. Law and social customs differentiate types of transactions and
then use the binary of “property” and “person” to justify outcomes (Appadurai
1986, 3). In the most notorious instance of overcommodification, US law
protected a market in human beings and then abolished it. More prosaically,
things routinely go in and out of market status. Cocaine was freely sold like
other commodities in the nineteenth century (Musto 1973, 7), evidenced by
its place in the Sears Roebuck catalog (Buxton 2006, 16–17), before states
and Congress limited who could sell and distribute it in the early twentieth
century (Musto 1973, 54). Similarly, a Coca-Cola bottle from 1902 (originally containing cocaine, giving the drink both its name and its kick) (3)
went from being trash to a collector’s item sold on eBay over the course of the
twentieth century (Rodrigues 2005).
Zelizer’s framework similarly traces legal doctrines such as coverture,
consortium, and rules allocating rights and obligations in courtship, engagement, cohabitation, and marriage. Along the way we are treated to facts that
invite us to see these doctrines in new light. I, for one, did not know that
meddling parents, rather than romantic rivals, may have been the most
common defendants in alienation of affection suits in the early twentieth
century (Zelizer 2005, 70). Nor that engagement rings only became common
in the nineteenth century, starting with men and women mutually exchanging rings (110). Nor that in 1996 families in the Dominican Republic
received a whopping $1.14 billion in the form of remittances from relatives
working elsewhere (222).
Zelizer crafts her theory out of this kind of factual material. Her analysis
of loss of consortium is illustrative. She first describes nineteenth-century
doctrine limiting who could assert loss of consortium claims (husbands, not
wives) and what they could complain about (the wife’s lost services, but not
companionship, much as a master would recover for the loss of a servant’s
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services) (71–72). Not until the 1950s and 1960s, Zelizer explains, did courts
generally equalize husbands’ and wives’ loss of consortium standing and
routinely compensate for lost companionship (72–73). This change, according to Zelizer, required courts to do what she calls the “relational work” (75)
of naming intimate relationships, designating specific practices, establishing
rights and obligations that come with the category, and allocating any losses
recognized by the law (62). Zelizer deploys her framework to make sense of
the evolution of loss of consortium doctrine.
First, they were deploying—and in the long term significantly
modifying—the grid of relationships available for legal action and the
distinctions among them. We see them, for example, increasingly distinguishing husband-wife relationships from those of master-servant and
parent-child. Second, they were matching relations, transactions, and
media, likewise altering legally acceptable definitions as they went along.
Third, courts partially reversed their reasoning. In addition to deducing
appropriate transactions and media from the publicly recognized relationship, they also reasoned from observed transactions to the relationship’s quality. In cases of injury to a spouse we see the participants
debating the character of interactions between spouses—how loving,
how attentive, and so on—in assessing appropriate damages. (75)
This pattern continues. Some courts have extended loss of consortium to
cohabitants and same-sex partners as well as parent-child relationships (75,
note 4), as when a Californian recovered loss of consortium damages arising
out of her female partner’s fatal mauling by their neighbor’s pitbull (Smith v.
Knoller, 2002).9
The expanded consortium doctrine and related news coverage reflect
two distinct levels of controversy: the kind of contests over expanding legally
recognized intimate relationships that have produced Defense of Marriage
Acts in most states, and doubts about the increased monetization of intimate
matters in life and in law. Zelizer notes crossover economist Robert Kuttner’s
assertion that “as the market vogue has gained force, realms that used to be
tempered by extra-market norms and institutions are being marketized with
accelerating force” (Kuttner quoted in Zelizer 2005, 25). Zelizer’s approach
takes us beyond nostalgia for a less marketized culture, challenging us to
rethink the easy assumption that increased marketization is always a bad
thing. Her economic sociological stance looks more closely at why we worry
about marketization in some circumstances but not in others. It improves
on existing ways of seeing the boundaries between markets and the rest
of human interactions by recognizing subtle and important gradations of
9. The Smith v. Knoller (2001) press coverage shows how deeply people care about how we
navigate the boundaries of intimacy and money and, moreover, how law plays a unique role in
expressing and justifying those ever-changing boundaries.
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commensurability and offering principled answers to questions like why we
worry more about prostitution than engagement rings or more about human
beings selling their kidneys than about intermediaries like organ banks
making money on the deal.
Imagine a man picking up the bill for a woman’s lunch at an expensive
restaurant. He might be a lobbyist taking a senator out to urge passage of a
bill, an attorney hoping to win a client’s business, a man treating his date, a
boss taking his secretary out to lunch, or some combination of the above. In
some of these contexts, the fact of paying could result in legal punishment.
The senator might face sanctions for being improperly influenced; and if the
lawyer paying for his client’s lunch is also making romantic advances, he
might violate ethical rules. Moreover, the fact of paying does not cleanly map
onto social power dynamics. The one who pays holds more power when the
boss pays for his secretary, but an attorney taking a potential client to lunch
hopes that she will become his boss by retaining him. Thus, in line with
Zelizer’s basic premise, the mere exchange of money in work relationships
does not distinguish between permissible and impermissible interactions, and
being the payor or payee does not tell us much either. Money is similarly
complex between intimates. If these two lunchmates are acquaintances going
out for the first time, paying for lunch may signal that it is a date. If they met
through an escort service, the relationship could be meretricious. If, instead,
the two met at their place of worship, paying for lunch may signal the man’s
intention to play his part of the traditional heterosexual exchange of food and
shelter in exchange for sex and homemaking. As is the case for work relationships, the exchange of money may or may not be associated with legal
sanctions. In short, there are many ways to understand the co-constitutive
role of money and social roles, and law needs a theory to coherently regulate
these interactions.
At a minimum, Connected Lives—in particular its focus on definition
and boundary-drawing—provides a good start. It certainly sheds light on
dating, romance, and care work. If Connected Lives also helps judges and
policy makers understand and resolve other issues, it may well provide a
theoretical basis for a legal regime that recognizes incomplete commensurability. The remainder of this essay explores this possibility by briefly applying
Zelizer’s analytic tools to contract and property disputes about genetic
materials.

APPLYING ZELIZER’S FRAMEWORK TO THE MARKET FOR
GENETIC MATERIAL
If Zelizer’s Connected Lives model works outside family relationships,
The Purchase of Intimacy could influence the way judges decide cases involving
disputes in far-flung areas such as biotechnology and intellectual property.
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Consider the leading case addressing markets for genetic material,10
Moore v. Regents of the University of California (1990). John Moore’s claims
against the University of California, his doctor, and biotech companies arose
out of his treatment for hairy cell leukemia. His doctor, David Golde, used
Moore’s blood, sperm, and other bodily materials to create and then patent a
cell line, which Golde, the university, and biotechnology companies marketed, all without Moore’s consent. The California Supreme Court declined
to recognize Moore’s conversion claim, but it did recognize another dimension of his injury by allowing him to sue Golde for breach of fiduciary duty. In
short, the court recognized rights based in breach of trust rather than property
or contract, ultimately reserving property rights in Moore’s tissues for others.
In a situation where scholars have not reached consensus about the case
(Rao 2000, 373; Kahn 2000; Boyle 2002; Goodwin 2006, 327), Zelizer’s lens
clarifies matters considerably. In Moore, the court adopted a Hostile Worlds
view by describing Moore’s claims to privacy and dignity as “round pegs” that
should not be forced into the “square hole of property” (Moore, 491). This
rubric treated the market-oriented nature of property as fundamentally
different from nonmarket concerns of privacy and dignity. Justice Arabian’s
concurrence even more clearly used Hostile Worlds language to condemn
Moore’s conversion claim for “commingl[ing] the sacred with the profane,”
contending that Moore, in seeking to protect “a right to sell one’s own body
tissue for profit,” asked the court “to regard the human vessel—the single most
venerated and protected subject in any civilized society—as an equal with the
basest commercial commodity” (Moore 497, Arabian, concurring, italics in
original). Yet the very same court allowed artificial persons, such as the
university and biotechnology companies, to treat Moore’s genetic material as
a commodity:
[T]he theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to
destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research.
. . . Because liability for conversion is predicated on a continuing
ownership interest, “companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty about
clear title exists” (quoting Congress,11 Moore 495–96, majority opinion).
In short, in a contest over commodifying genetic material, the court rejected
Moore’s property claims in order to support property claims asserted by the
university, biotechnology companies, and Dr. Golde.
In contrast, Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion in Moore represented a
view that moves between the Nothing But and Connected Lives perspectives.
10. By genetic “material,” I mean both parts of human bodies (like blood and tissue) and
genetic information (like family histories of genetic disease).
11. Office of Technology Assessment, New Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership
of Human Tissues and Cells.
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He began in Nothing But terms, broadly defining property as “‘every species
of right and interest capable of being enjoyed . . . upon which it is practicable
to place a money value’ ” (Moore, 509, Mosk, dissenting, quoting Yuba River
Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation District 1929, 129). Still proceeding on the
assumption of expansive market thinking, he then asserted that Moore “at
least had the right to do with his own tissue whatever the defendants did with it: i.e.,
he could have contracted with researchers and pharmaceutical companies
to develop and exploit the vast commercial potential of his tissue and its
products” (Moore, 510). But later in his dissent Justice Mosk moved
beyond Nothing But thinking to simultaneously embrace property and
personhood by concluding that “every individual has a legally protectable
property interest in his own body and its products,” an interest grounded
in “a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body as the physical
and temporal expression of the unique human persona” (515).
The contrast between Justice Mosk’s linking of dignity and markets
and Justice Arabian’s diametrical opposition to linking them reveals the
superiority of Connected Lives approaches over Hostile Worlds or Nothing
But views. Justice Mosk grounds Moore’s property interests in the dignitary
interest of “the unique human persona,” as well as in the dangers of granting the university’s, Dr. Golde’s, and the biotechnology companies’ greater
interests in Moore’s tissues than Moore himself enjoyed. By invoking
property and personhood in the same breath, his dissent embraces the “both/
and” spirit central to Zelizer’s Connected Lives approach. The dissent transcends the two-dimensionality of Hostile Worlds and the one-dimensionality
of Nothing But approaches, offering precisely the kind of three-dimensional
perspective that might capture gradations in commensurability.
This simultaneous embrace of purported opposites invites an extension
of Zelizer’s theory to a normative level, using Justice Mosk’s insights about the
distributive injustice of the majority’s allocation of all property rights to the
university, physician, and companies. While he does not explicitly condemn
the majority for granting artificial persons greater rights to human tissue than
the natural persons from whom the tissues were taken, the basic unfairness of
treating the two types of parties differently is central to his opinion.
In the remainder of this essay, I will apply Zelizer’s (2005) four-part
Connected Lives analysis to show how it allows us to “stop agonizing over
whether or not money corrupts, but instead analyze what combinations of
economic activity and intimate relations produce happier, more just, and
more productive lives” (298).

Classifying the Relationship
The majority opinion in Moore looks to two kinds of relationships—
medical treatment and research—in order to separately analyze Moore’s
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fiduciary duty claims against Golde, and his conversion claims against the
university, biotechnology companies, and Golde. Each type of relationship
contains particular rules for conduct that apply to one party in the transaction, such as the physician’s and researchers’ obligations to obtain informed
consent. By concluding that Moore could sue Dr. Golde for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of his medical treatment but not sue the university and
other defendants for conversion arising out of the research, the court drew a
new boundary to differentiate between rights and obligations arising in
medical treatment and research. According to the majority opinion, this
boundary is policed by the “well-established principle” (483) that treating
physicians owe their patients a fiduciary duty to disclose all material information in obtaining consent to treatment, including economic and research
interests that might affect the doctor’s medical judgment (485). By separating
the tangled relationship between Moore and Golde into treatment and
research, the court set the stage for evaluating legal rights and obligations
arising out of each separate relationship.

Examining Transactions within the Relationship
Separating Moore’s interactions as the patient and Golde’s as the treating physician from their interactions as research subject and researcher highlights the different boundaries within each relationship. Both physicians and
researchers must obtain informed consent from patients and subjects, but
physicians owe additional fiduciary duties that researchers do not. The court’s
focus on Golde’s fiduciary duty to Moore as a physician precluded imposing
similar duties on the university and biotechnology companies, since they
were not physicians and thus not required to obtain Moore’s informed
consent for medical procedures (486–87). Taking these defendants and their
likely deep pockets out of the equation has distributive consequences, limiting patient/research subjects’ prospects of recovery.
One transaction in the seven-year relationship between Moore and
Golde stands out as a problematic blurring of treatment, research, and commercial relationships. Years after Moore’s surgery, he moved to Seattle, and
flew to Los Angeles periodically for Dr. Golde to withdraw blood, bone
marrow, and semen. Moore asked Dr. Golde if a Seattle doctor could do this
work to save him the trip, to which Dr. Golde responded by offering to pay for
the plane tickets and to house him at the upscale Beverly Wilshire Hotel.
Later, Moore refused to sign a form granting the University of California all
rights to cell lines developed from his blood or bone marrow (Skloot 2006,
41). This transaction and the many related transactions of Moore traveling
to California for what he thought was medical treatment, when Golde was
also mining his genetic material for research and commercial gain, form the
centerpiece of the court’s analysis.
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Evaluating the Media in Which Economic Exchanges Occurred
Media, in Zelizer’s analysis, reflect and constitute social relationships.
For example, a boss might give a retiring employee a gold watch, and a man
intending to become engaged to a woman may give her a diamond ring. The
exchanges themselves are highly stylized, such as presentation of the watch
with fanfare at a retirement party or presentation of the ring nestled in dessert
as the culmination of a romantic dinner to be placed on the fourth finger of
the woman’s left hand (Zelizer 2005, 37–38). According to Zelizer, we often
reverse the significance of media, mistakenly thinking that media and transactions transform relations. Instead, just as the watch does not create retirement or the ring create an engagement, the tokens reflect the social choice
already made.
In the Moore case, exchanges of value are supposed to take different
forms and go in different directions in medical treatment and research.
Money is the most obvious medium of exchange, though barter and perks like
plane tickets and a night in a hotel suffice. Patients pay their doctors substantial sums of money. In contrast, researchers often pay their subjects, but
far more modest sums, often as a token recognition of inconvenience and
perhaps to signal separation of subjects’ claims from their genetic or other
material by virtue of their having accepted payment for their transfer.
In Moore, we might say that the court recognized Moore’s fiduciary duty
claim in part because Golde provided improper media by offering to pay for
plane tickets and to house Moore in swank digs, and also that the exchange
of money or its equivalent was flowing in the wrong direction, from physician
to patient instead of the other way around. It also held that when the medium
of exchange was valuable genetic material, transferred from Moore to the
defendants under false pretenses, the false pretenses mattered more than the
fact of the exchange. By focusing on the general social benefit of medical
research, the court effectively implied an exchange of Moore’s genetic material for general social benefits of research. Had the court more closely examined media, as Zelizer suggests, it might have recognized the distributional
asymmetry of allocating all monetary benefits flowing from the exchange of
genetic material to the researchers.12

Drawing Boundaries between Proper and Improper Economic
Exchanges within Relationships
In everyday life, people use names and practices to mark boundaries
between medical and research relations and between participants in those

12. For a similar argument, see Rao (2007).
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relations. Patients and office personnel call treating physicians “doctor,” and
professional rules require that doctors and patients refrain from sexual intimacy during the course of treatment. Institutions governing research, for
their part, mark boundaries between themselves and research subjects with
names like “principal investigator” and “research participant” and practices
like requiring Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for human subject
research. Elaborate IRB requirements are meant to protect research participants from harm. In addition, IRB practices mandate informed consent
through consent forms and notice to subjects that they may withdraw from
participation in the study. For purposes of Zelizer’s format, it is worth noting
that IRB procedures also require detailed disclosure of any payments made to
research subjects.
Consistent with Zelizer’s framework, the Moore court delineated
improper practices within the doctor/patient and researcher/subject relationships. However, while it recognized Moore’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for
Dr. Golde’s failure to disclose parallel research and medical treatment, it did
not condemn Golde and his fellow researchers for failing to obtain Moore’s
informed consent to turn his genetic material into an extraordinarily lucrative commodity.
A case decided thirteen years after Moore suggests how doctrine might
evolve to more precisely account for shades of commensurability in relationships between genetic researchers and the subjects who provide raw material
for that research, thus reflecting the Connected Lives approach. In Greenberg
v. Miami Children’s Hospital (2003), a federal trial court in Florida, like the
California Supreme Court in Moore, gave priority to the property claims of
hospitals and universities over the human beings who provided genetic material for research and medical treatment. However, the court in Greenberg also
recognized a particular type of researcher-subject relationship that was akin to
a partnership. This designation, coupled with analysis of transactions and
media, allowed the court to recognize research subjects’ claims for restitution.
In Greenberg, families with Canavan disease provided biological samples
and extensive family information to researchers to hasten isolation of the
gene associated with the disease and to improve treatment. When the university patented the gene and moved to limit access, the research subjects
sought accessibility to the products of that information (i.e., free or low-cost
genetic testing) rather than a piece of the profits on conversion grounds. The
court refused. But, more importantly for our purposes, the court recognized
the plaintiffs’ right to assert a claim for unjust enrichment. This restitution
claim—a cross between contract and tort—could prevent universities and
other artificial persons from retaining benefits wrongly obtained from those
research participants.
In the spirit of Zelizer’s Connected Lives approach, the court classified
the relationship as “more than just a donor-donee relationship” (Greenberg
2003, 1072) and laid the foundation for recognizing the participants’
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entitlement to a measure of control over the fruits of their implicit partnership: “[T]he facts paint a picture of a continuing research collaboration that
involved Plaintiffs also investing time and significant resources in the race to
isolate the Canavan gene. Therefore, given the facts as alleged, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the requisite elements of an unjust
enrichment claim” (1073). By treating the transaction as a gift for purposes of
conversion doctrine and an exchange for purposes of unjust enrichment
claims, the court recognized the complexity that Zelizer makes central to her
argument. This precision invites new methods to chart the complex ways that
money, control, and scientific research interact. Moreover, by recognizing the
research participants’ unjust enrichment claim, a hybrid of tort and contract,
the court invoked the type of doctrinal hybridity that Zelizer’s Connected
Lives contemplates. Indeed, the complexity of the overlap of money and
genetic material demands this kind of case outcome.

CONCLUSION
The Purchase of Intimacy identifies, describes, and critiques reductionist
approaches to regulating overlaps of intimacy—Hostile Worlds, which falsely
assumes an impermeable barrier between markets and intimate relationships,
and Nothing But, which subsumes these complex transactions within something bigger, such as market exchange. By identifying Connected Lives,
a nuanced alternative approach that avoids the absolutes of reductionist
approaches, Zelizer offers a perspective that focuses attention on incomplete
commensurability, an essential task where market and supposedly nonmarket
realms intersect. In doing so, Zelizer’s approach gives judges, academics,
lawyers, and lay people a vantage point on markets and intimacy that reflects
how people actually live their lives. The utility of Connected Lives is further
demonstrated by applying it beyond Zelizer’s context of intimate relationships, to critique the outcome of Moore v. Regents of the University of California
(1990) and to suggest the benefits of a more nuanced approach to marketizing
genetic materials in research.
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